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Abstract: The literature analysing social efficiency of entry argues that entry is always 
socially excessive in industries with asymmetric cost firms and no scale economies. We show 
that  exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for this result. In a simple model with 
endogenous R&D investment by the more cost efficient firm, thus creating endogenous cost 
asymmetry, we show that entry is socially insufficient instead of excessive if slope of the 
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The literature analysing social efficiency of entry in oligopolistic markets gets momentum 
with the work by Mankiw and Whinston (1986). While this literature mainly concentrates on 
industries with scale economies and symmetric cost firms,
1 Ghosh and Saha (2007) provide a 
new perspective to this literature by analysing social efficiency of entry under cost 
asymmetry and no scale economies. They show that entry is always socially excessive,
2 thus 
suggesting that anti-competitive entry regulation policies are always desirable in industries 
with asymmetric cost firms and no scale economies.
3  
  We show that exogenous cost asymmetry is responsible for the result of Ghosh and 
Saha (2007). In a simple model with endogenous R&D investment by the more cost efficient 
firm, thus creating endogenous cost asymmetry, we show that entry is socially insufficient 
instead of excessive if slope of the marginal cost of R&D is not very high. Hence, if cost 
asymmetry is determined endogenously, the anti-competitive entry regulation policies may 
not be justifiable with no scale economies. 
 
2. The model and the results 
Assume that there is a firm (firm 0) which can produce a product with the marginal cost of 
production c and there is free entry of large number of firms (called entrants), each of which 
can produce the product at the marginal cost of production d, with dc ≥ . An entrant enters 
the industry if its output is positive. We assume that firm 0 invests in R&D to reduce its 
                                                            
1 See, Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), Okuno-Fujiwara and Suzumura (1993), Anderson et al. (1995), Fudenberg 
and Tirole (2000), Cabral (2004) and Ghosh and Morita (2007a and b) for some other works on social efficiency 
of entry under scale economies. 
2 Excessive (insufficient) entry implies that welfare maximizing number of firms is lower (higher) than the free 
entry equilibrium number of firms. 
3 Governments often take actions to foster or deter entry into particular industries. For example, in the post-war 
period, preventing excessive entry was a guiding principle in the Japanese industrial policy (Suzumura and 
Kiyono, 1987 and Suzumura, 1995). 2 
 
marginal cost of production from c to () 0 cx − > , where x is the R&D investment of firm 0. 






  The inverse market demand function is P = a – q, where P is price and q is the total 
output sold. We derive the condition for insufficient entry under a general demand function in 
the Appendix. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the entrants decide whether to enter the 
industry. At stage 2, firm 0 determines its R&D investment. At stage 3, firm 0 and all the 
entrants which have entered the industry produce like Cournot oligopolists. We solve the 
game through backward induction. 
If n entrants enter the industry and the R&D investment of firm 0 is x, firm 0 and the 
ith entrant maximize the following expressions respectively to determine their outputs: 
0
0 ()
q Max a q c x q −−+           ( 1 )  
()
i
i q Ma x aqd q −− ,  1,2,..., in = .         ( 2 )  




(1 ) ( )
2

















,  1,2,..., in = .         ( 4 )  





[(1 ) ( ) ]
(2 ) 2




















,  1,2,..., in = .        ( 6 )  
  We do the analysis under assumptions A1 – A4: 
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  A1: (a – 2d + c) > 0. This assumption ensures that the outputs of firm 0 and all the 
entrants are positive with no innovation by firm 0. This is similar to the assumption made in 










. This will ensure 
* () 0 cx − >  for a given n, where 
* x  is the 
equilibrium R&D investment of firm 0. This will also satisfy the second order condition for 
equilibrium R&D investment. 
A3:  a < 2d. Given that 
* () 0 cx − > , this is necessary but not sufficient for 
encouraging only a finite number of entrants to enter the industry. This assumption will also 










. This will make entry of at least one entrant profitable. 
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Assumption A2 satisfies 













We get from (4) and (7) that the net equilibrium output of an entrant is zero if 
[ 2 ( )(2 ) ] 2 [ ( )(2 ) ] 0 n a de ad c a de ad c −− −++ −− −+ > .      ( 8 )  
The following result follows immediately from (8). 
 
Lemma 1: Free entry equilibrium number of entrant is finite if  (2 ) ea d c − +  is not greater 
than 2( ) ad − . 
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, it reduces the effectiveness of R&D by firm 0. In this situation, R&D by 
firm 0 does not deter the entrants from entering the industry, and infinitely many entrants 
enter at the free entry equilibrium.  
If  
( ) 2( )
(2 ) (2 )
ad ad
e




, i.e., slope of the marginal cost of R&D is not very 
high, the free entry equilibrium number of entrants is finite and is given by 
* 2[ ( 2 ) ( )]
2( ) ( 2 )
ea d c a d
n














, i.e., slope of the marginal cost of R&D is low, we get 
* 0 n = , thus 
creating a corner solution in the sense that no entrant enters the industry. To prove our point 
in the simplest way, we ignore this situation.  
The above discussion suggests that R&D by firm 0 reduces competitiveness of the 
entrants and may encourage only a finite number of entrants to enter the industry. 
Now determine the welfare maximizing number of entrants. Welfare is the sum of 
“the profit of firm 0, the total profits of the entrants that have entered the industry and 
consumer surplus”. Following the tradition of the literature, we assume that the social planner 
can control the number of entrants but it cannot affect the product market behaviour of the 
firms, i.e., the firms compete like Cournot oligopolists. It is intuitive that the social planner 
will not restrict entry of firm 0, since it is the more cost efficient firm. However, the social 
planner may have the incentive to restrict entry of more cost inefficient firms. 
The social planner determines the welfare maximizing number of firms by 
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equilibrium number of firms 
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. Because we are considering 
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 for cd ≤ , since 
2
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* () 0 cx −>  is satisfied at 
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The following proposition is immediate from the above discussion. 
 
Proposition 1: If 
( ) 2( )
(2 ) (2 )
ad ad
e




, i.e., slope of the marginal cost of  R&D is 
not very high, the free entry equilibrium number of entrants is 
* 2[ ( 2 ) ( )]
2( ) ( 2 )
ea d c a d
n





and entry is socially insufficient. 
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  Proposition 1 is in contrast to Ghosh and Saha (2007), and shows that if slope of the 
marginal cost of R&D of firm 0 is not very high, entry is socially insufficient under 
endogenous cost asymmetry and no scale economies.  
The reason for Proposition 1 will be clear once we look at the effect of n on the R&D 
investment of firm 0 at 
* 2[ ( 2 ) ( )]
2( ) ( 2 )
ea d c a d
n
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∂− − − +
,                  (12) 
which implies that the R&D investment of firm 0 increases as the number of more cost 
inefficient firms increases from the free entry equilibrium number of firms. 
Entry of more cost inefficient firms creates two effects in our analysis. First, like 
Ghosh and Saha (2007), for a given R&D investment of firm 0, entry of more cost inefficient 
firms tends to reduce welfare at the free entry equilibrium number of firms by shifting output 
from the more cost efficient firm to the more cost inefficient firms. Second, R&D investment 
of firm 0 increases at the free entry equilibrium number of firms, and this effect tends to 
increase welfare by making firm 0 more cost efficient. If 
( ) 2( )
(2 ) (2 )
ad ad
e





show that the R&D effect outweighs the output switching effect and increases welfare at the 
free entry equilibrium number of firms.  
It is worth mentioning that if slope of the marginal cost of R&D of firm 0 is 









, infinitely many entrants enter the industry, and it 
approximates the case of exogenous cost asymmetry by reducing the effectiveness of R&D 
investment significantly. In this situation, the above-mentioned R&D effect is negligible and 




In contrast to the vast literature examining social efficiency of entry under scale economies 
and symmetric cost firms, Ghosh and Saha (2007) show that entry is always socially 
excessive under cost asymmetry and no scale economies. We show that exogenous cost 
asymmetry is responsible for their result. Considering endogenous cost asymmetry created by 
the R&D investment of the more cost efficient firm, we show that entry is socially 
insufficient instead of excessive if slope of the marginal cost of R&D is not very high. Hence, 




















The case of a general demand function: Assume that the inverse market demand function is 
P(q), with  0 P′<  and  0 P′′ ≤ . 
 If  n entrants enter the industry, firm 0 and the ith entrant maximize the following 




q Max P c x q −+                          (A1) 
  ()
i
i q Max P d q − ,   1,2,..., in = .                     (A2) 
The respective equilibrium outputs are determined by 
 
*
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∂ ′′ +− =
∂
.                       (A6) 
We assume that the cost of R&D is such that 
* () 0 cx − > , where 
* x  is the equilibrium R&D 
investment. 
Free entry equilibrium number of entrants is given by P – d = 0. 
  Now consider welfare maximizing number of entrants. Due to the symmetry of the 
entrants, the welfare maximizing number of entrants is determined by maximizing the 
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0 i qqn q =+ . 
Differentiating (A7) with respect to n and evaluating it at the free entry equilibrium 
where P = d, and using (A3), (A4) and (A6), we get that 
* *
** * 0
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,                         (A9) 
implying that the total effect (which includes also the effect through the R&D investment) of 
n on the equilibrium output of firm 0 dominates the effect of n on the total outputs of the 
entrants due to the change in the R&D investment of firm 0. It can be checked that 
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